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The Democratic Republic of the Congo is facing two crises: a potentially explosive Ebola epi-
demic and a major insurgency. But they 
are not wholly distinct from each other: 
the first is intertwined with the second, 
and public mistrust and political vio-
lence add a dangerous dimension to the 
Ebola epidemic. The World Health Or-
ganization and other health emergency 
responders will increasingly find them-
selves fighting outbreaks in insecure, 
misgoverned or ungoverned zones, pos-
sibly experiencing active conflict. Yet 
the WHO has neither the mission nor 
the capabilities to navigate these secu-
rity threats. We cannot expect that the 
usual public health strategy will succeed 
when health workers’ lives are directly 
imperiled and community resistance 
runs deep. Tackling health emergencies 
amidst complex humanitarian crises re-
quires fresh thinking.
Ebola in the DRC
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is bitterly accustomed to 
novel diseases and political violence. 
The North Kivu Ebola epidemic is 
the DRC’s tenth Ebola outbreak and 
now the second largest globally, after 
that in the West African countries of 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in 
2014.1 Making matters worse, com-
batants vie for dominance in the re-
gion, displacing millions of residents 
fleeing violence and disease—which 
could accelerate and spread within and 
beyond the DRC.2 Guerrilla and rebel 
groups, notably the Allied Democratic 
Forces, fight with government forces 
and international peacekeepers. Yet the 
long-running United Nations Stabiliza-
tion Mission (MONUSCO) in DRC 
has been ineffectual, with UN troops 
themselves targeted as hostile forces.3 
More than two decades of conflict has 
destroyed any sense of order and struc-
ture. Systematic rape, murder, and 
kidnapping have eroded security and 
instilled fear.4 Within this quagmire, 
Ebola has now spread to Butembo (a 
city of about one million people), while 
Uganda has vaccinated health workers 
in preparation for cross-border cases.
The WHO has adopted a “ring” 
strategy, vaccinating health workers 
and individuals at heightened risk of 
exposure. The investigational vaccine 
is highly effective, yet many infected 
and exposed people are lost to follow-
up, often hidden by distrustful family 
members. In an atmosphere of violence 
and mistrust, vaccination and contact 
tracing are seriously disrupted. Each 
concussive rebel attack has coincided 
with a major spike in cases.
The U.S. State Department has 
banned all U.S. personnel from the hot 
zone, including from the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention and 
the U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID).5 In the run-up 
to the DRC elections, the State De-
partment also announced an “ordered 
departure” of U.S. personnel even from 
Kinshasa, where the CDC was working 
with the DRC Ministry of Health to 
track cases in North Kivu.6 The Kin-
shasa Ebola operations center may be 
left with as little as one CDC expert. 
Other countries, such as France and 
the United Kingdom, have followed 
the U.S. lead and have also withdrawn 
from North Kivu. The Trump adminis-
tration apparently has adopted a policy 
of zero risk tolerance, fearing a “Beng-
hazi-style” attack. In a vicious cycle, the 
few brave health workers remaining are 
under threat, and their inability to con-
tain the epidemic has sadly become yet 
another cause of community frustra-
tion and anger. 
A recent expert consensus statement 
urged the Trump administration to de-
ploy all key assets while managing the 
security risk with “smart” peacekeep-
ing, diplomacy, and community en-
gagement.7 The CDC personnel ban 
will certainly result in more disease and 
death in local populations. Deploying 
needed assistance is not just the right 
thing to do; it is also in our national 
interests. Fighting outbreaks at their 
source can halt an epidemic before it 
spreads regionally, even globally. Global 
health leadership enhances American 
“soft power.”
In mid-October 2018, acting under 
the International Health Regulations, 
the WHO director-general Tedros 
Ghebreyesus convened an emergency 
committee, which recognized the po-
tential for cross-border transmission 
but did not recommend declaring the 
North Kivu outbreak a public health 
emergency of international concern. 
This was a mistake. A PHEIC declara-
tion would have underscored the ur-
gency and raised the political profile of 
the health crisis amidst the protracted 
violence and humanitarian crisis.8
Still, for the first time ever, the 
WHO director-general requested UN 
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Security Council action on behalf of 
global health security.9 On October 30, 
the Security Council condemned politi-
cal attacks, demanding “full, safe, im-
mediate and unhindered access for the 
humanitarian personnel.”10 Incredibly, 
though, it called on warring parties to 
“respect” international humanitarian 
law—a plea sure to fall on empty ears in 
a conflict where violations are the norm, 
while doing little to enhance peacekeep-
ing operations or mobilize funding. The 
Security Council urged the DRC to 
take responsibility for security, despite 
the Congolese military’s own record of 
repression and weak capacities.
Commissions established in the af-
termath of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa urged decisive UN action 
when a health emergency rises beyond 
the WHO’s mandate and capacity.11 
Now is that time, both because of the 
urgency of the DRC epidemic and to set 
a precedent, leading the way for future 
complex health emergencies. Fighting 
disease in conflict zones and disaster 
settings is rapidly becoming the new 
normal. We need to plan accordingly. 
Consider just a few recent examples 
in which epidemics have coincided 
with political violence. In December 
2018, the WHO was forced to extend a 
PHEIC for wild polio, which is stub-
bornly persisting in war-torn Afghani-
stan and Pakistan. Taliban fighters have 
killed dozens of polio vaccine workers, 
threatening countless others.12
In Yemen, cholera has killed several 
thousand people, as the country’s health 
system unravels due to civil strife and 
foreign aggression. Beyond disease, the 
people of Yemen are dying from starva-
tion.13 Haiti, another country with weak 
governance, has unsuccessfully fought a 
cholera epidemic ever since UN person-
nel inadvertently introduced the disease 
following a devastating earthquake in 
2010.
In unstable countries and regions, 
health workers are at major risk. In 
2018, Boko Haram killed and abducted 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross personnel in Nigeria. The ICRC’s 
plea for mercy did not save the health 
workers’ lives.14 In Syria, rebels and gov-
ernment forces have killed hundreds of 
health workers, including through in-
tentional targeting.15 All this violence 
has occurred despite Security Coun-
cil resolutions condemning attacks on 
health workers and facilities.16 Inter-
national humanitarian law proscribes 
attacks on health workers, but it does 
not apply to humanitarian workers. The 
UN, mindful of this gap in legal protec-
tion, has nonetheless refused to extend 
the Geneva Conventions to include hu-
manitarian personnel.17
A Blueprint for Fighting Disease 
in Conflict Zones
Given these trends, it makes little sense to use the same public health 
playbook that has worked in the past. 
Health workers must be able to oper-
ate freely and safely to bring infectious 
diseases under control. Political vio-
lence undermines public health’s abil-
ity to reach contagious, exposed, or 
at-risk individuals to conduct vaccina-
tion campaigns and contact investiga-
tions or to separate the sick from the 
healthy through isolation or quarantine. 
Health workers and patients must have 
secure access to clinics and hospitals for 
diagnosis and medical treatment. At the 
same time, first responders must gain 
the public’s trust. If local communities 
fail to cooperate, if they hide sick fam-
ily members, if they follow unsafe burial 
rituals, or if they go underground or flee 
the conflict, an outbreak can rapidly 
spin out of control. Further, misinfor-
mation can endanger health workers. 
In 2015, Guinean villagers slaughtered 
health workers under the belief that 
they were spreading Ebola.18
Here, we offer a blueprint for fight-
ing diseases in complex humanitarian 
emergencies. The building blocks of 
security and trust include high-level 
political support, street-level diploma-
cy, community engagement, enhanced 
funding, and protection of health pro-
fessionals working in conflict or disaster 
zones. When epidemics rage in hostile 
environments, high-income countries 
should not stand idly by but, rather, 
join the WHO and local health workers 
on the ground, where assistance is badly 
needed. This is all far from simple, but 
the alternative is to allow dangerous 
diseases to go unchecked, threatening 
countries, regions, and the globe.
Peacekeeping. Peacekeepers are sup-
posed to act as a neutral force, sepa-
rating warring factions and providing 
“space” for diplomacy to end hostilities. 
Yet where communities feel alienated 
from decades of violence—including 
rape, torture, and possibly genocide19—
peacekeepers can become engulfed in 
the conflict. Humanitarian organiza-
tions have also resisted armed pro-
tection because they want to serve as 
mediators, health advocates, and heal-
ers.20 Consequently, the United Nations 
must fundamentally reform peacekeep-
ing conducted in a health emergency.
The Security Council should provide 
peacekeepers with a mandate and mo-
dalities fit for the purpose of quelling a 
health emergency. Separate from other 
peacekeeping missions that may be op-
erating, such a health peacekeeping mis-
sion’s mandate should specifically be to 
safeguard the public health response, 
deploying sufficient forces to enable 
health workers to operate safely. This 
requires peacekeeper training on health 
emergencies and working cooperatively 
with first responders. To build trust, 
forces should be trained on the values 
and strategies of “community polic-
ing”—engaging community members 
as partners, listening to their concerns, 
and respecting their rights and dignity. 
Peacekeepers must work with anthro-
pologists and local leaders to value local 
culture, customs, and languages. Peace-
keepers must build trust and security 
from the bottom up, rather than from 
the top down.
Diplomacy. A classic tool of state-
craft, diplomacy needs to become a 
central piece of the global response to 
health emergencies during complex 
humanitarian crises. The clear aim of 
negotiations with belligerents and com-
munity members would be safe entry 
and a secure working environment 
for health and humanitarian workers. 
While overall conflict resolution is nec-
essary, the immediate goal should be 
to create the respect and trust needed 
for impartial and independent health 
and humanitarian workers to function. 
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Much as diplomacy helped secure the 
Taliban’s agreement to allow health 
workers in Afghanistan to carry out 
polio vaccination,20 negotiations could 
result in an agreement that insurgents 
would avoid interfering with the public 
health response. 
Deployment of all needed assets. A 
zero-risk policy for deployment of per-
sonnel from the United States and other 
high-income countries is a recipe for 
failure. The WHO and the DRC have 
requested U.S. deployment to the Ebola 
hot zone. The CDC could fill signifi-
cant capacity gaps, such as surveillance, 
laboratory testing, and contact investi-
gations. Other public agencies, such as 
USAID and the National Institutes of 
Health’s Fogarty International Center, 
could provide peer-to-peer training in 
diagnostics, treatment, and the safe use 
of personal protective equipment.
Just as the CDC has expertise in 
emergency response, the State Depart-
ment has diplomatic and intelligence 
capacities, and thus the responsibility to 
act. The diplomatic power of the Unit-
ed States extends beyond intelligence 
and mediation to political leverage. 
President Obama, for example, secured 
an unprecedented Security Council 
resolution, which was a milestone in 
ultimately bringing the West African 
Ebola epidemic under control. Bringing 
hostile parties to the negotiating table, 
as recently occurred in Yemen, requires 
high-level political attention. That level 
of political action has been sorely miss-
ing in the DRC.
The United States should urgently 
create a strategic plan for future deploy-
ment of expert personnel to conflict 
zones. Rather than having zero risk tol-
erance, the United States should manage 
the risk by shoring up security, engaging 
diplomats, and embedding U.S. person-
nel in ongoing international humanitar-
ian operations through, for example, the 
United Nations.
International assistance. The Inter-
national Health Regulations require ev-
ery nation to create core health system 
capacities to detect, report, and respond 
to health emergencies, and they charge 
states with providing international as-
sistance to build those capacities.21 Yet 
most countries have failed to meet IHR 
standards, including for laboratories, 
surveillance, risk communication, and 
human resources. And high-income 
countries have virtually ignored their 
responsibilities for international assis-
tance. The U.S. launched the Global 
Health Security Agenda in 2014 to ex-
pand capacities, and it recently recom-
mitted itself to the GHSA at the GHSA 
Ministerial in Indonesia. Yet Congress 
has not reauthorized GSHA funding. 
Investing in preparedness is much less 
costly than crisis response.
Developing national, inclusive 
health systems is a sure way to build 
public trust. Beyond health systems, in-
ternational assistance should extend to 
meeting basic needs such as clean wa-
ter and nutritious food. The public is 
much more likely to view foreign health 
workers as a force for good if their pres-
ence comes with tangible long-term, 
sustained improvement in health and 
social services—even as ensuring such 
needs should hardly depend on a health 
crisis that poses international risk.
Toward a New Public Health 
Playbook
The standard public health playbook is still vital, combining therapeutic 
countermeasures such as vaccines and 
antiviral medications with public health 
measures such as surveillance, contact 
investigations, and hygiene. But in an 
era when health emergencies coincide 
with complex humanitarian crises, we 
cannot expect the old public health to 
succeed; we must adapt to the world 
we live in. Where distrust and insecu-
rity run deep, politics, diplomacy, and 
peacekeeping become vital assets. With 
the United Nations Security Council, 
the Trump administration, and Western 
allies standing idle while international 
health actors struggle, the interconnect-
ed epidemics of violence and disease es-
calate.
The Ebola crisis in parts of West 
Africa spurred major reforms to the 
WHO’s health emergency program. 
The ongoing Ebola and humanitarian 
crisis in North Kivu ought to similarly 
transform how we understand, prepare 
for, and respond to future public health 
crises in hotbeds of violence and human 
suffering. Political actors will need to as-
sume their responsibilities if humanitar-
ians and health workers are to carry out 
theirs.
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